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STUDENT NOTES
dence to support it, 'if there (is) sufficient evidence to warrant a
conviction of rape.' As the evidence in the Collins case showed that
if rape had been committed, the defendant was the sole actor in
the consummation of the crime, point 2 of the syllabus in the Collins
case is broader than is required for a decision of the case, and the
holding of this Court, as disclosed by the opinion and the facts
contained therein." The court concludes that ". . the broad lan-
guage embraced in point 2 of the syllabus of the Collins case ...
should, in our opinion, not be carried on in the decision of the
instant case."'9 It is important to note that the court cited other
articles in the Law Quarterly on the subject, and that these articles
represent the view that the syllabus is not "the law" in West Vir-
ginia.20 The case thus, as indicated earlier, squarely presents the
question of the role of the syllabus and indicates that it must be
read in the light of the opinion; that the syllabus may be broader
than justified by the opinion; thus the court indicates the syllabus
is only an official headnote prepared for the general information
of the legal profession and public at large, and the court expressly
disapproved the dictum in the Burdette case. It is further submitted
that those who believe the syllabus represents the law of an adjudi-
cated case are forced to admit otherwise, for here in the syllabus,
the court states that the syllabus of the Collins case was read'in
the light of the opinion2 -an interesting paradox for those who
believe the syllabus is "the law" in West Virginia.
J. L. McC.
UNwioKm CONDrTONAL SALEs Acr-AN ANNOTATION.-With the
advent of extensive credit buying, there has been an increased
interest in the law of secured transactions. Therefore, it seems
timely to discuss one of the more commonly used security devices,
the conditional sale, as affected by West Virginia law.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act,' was adopted in West
Virginia in 19212 and was reenacted in 1925.3 The present version
19 State v. Franklin, 79 S.E.2d 692, 699-700, 703 (W. Va. 1953).
20 Id. at 700. "For an illuminating and learned discussion of the function
of the syllabus of a case decided by this Court, see 'The Law-In W. Va.', by
Thomas P. Hardman, Dean of the College of Law of West Virginia University,
47 W. Va. L.Q. 23, and note by Dean Hardman, 47 W. Va. L.Q. 209."
21 See note 1 supra.
1W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3 (Michie 1955).
2 W. Va. Acts 1921, c. 75.
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of the act4 is little changed from the 1925 act. Prior to its adoption
in 1921, there were domestically drafted statutory provisions regu-
lating the validity and recording of conditional sales.5 The uniform
act is to be interpreted so as to maintain uniformity of result
throughout the states adopting the act.0 The original draft was
approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1918,7
and has been adopted by 12 jurisdictions." In 1943, the act was
withdrawn, being superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code,9
promulgated in 1951,10 which has since been enacted by Pennsyl-
vania alone." This note will be concerned with the West Virginia
act,12 in three particulars: (1) legislative expression; (2) judicial
interpretation; and (8) jurisdictional comparison.
Legislative Expression
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was adopted to provide an
efficient system for the filing and perfecting of conditional sales and
"to make uniform the law relating thereto."'3
By and large, the West Virginia act conforms to the wording
of the act as promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. 14 There are certain clarifying words added, in no way
3 W. Va. Acts 1925, c. 64.
4W. VA. CODE C. 40, art. 3, §§ 1 through 32 (Michie 1955).
5 W. VA. CODE c. 74, § 3 (1868).
6 W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 31 (Michie 1955).
7 HANDBeROK OF THE NATONAL CONFERENCE OF COMNSSIONERS ON UNI-
FORm STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING
N rrs Sncry-TnmD YEAR 279 (1954).
8 ld. at 282: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin, and with modifications
in Hawaii, Indiana and Pennsylvania.
9id. at 282.
10 Id. at 225.
'l Id. at 225; as of December 1, 1954. Should West Virginia adopt the
Uniform Commercial Code, a concentrated study of its provisions as affecting
the West Virginia decisions passing on the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
would be necessary, since the Uniform Commercial Code considerably modifies
and rewords the provisions relating to conditional sales; see UNIFORm COM-
MECLA.L CODE art. 9 (1952).
1
2 W. VA_ CODE c. 40, art. 3 (Michie 1955).
13 W. Va. Acts 1921, c. 75; see Jones, Uniform State Laws-Reasons for
Their Further Enactment in West Virginia, 26 W. Va. L.Q. 121 (1920);
Note, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 139 (1920).
14See 2 UNIFoRm LAws ANN. (1922) (hereinafter cited as 2 U.L.A.)
for the provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act as promulgated by the
commissioners.
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changing the content of the act.' 5 The statute, in reference between
sections, specifies that it is an "article" rather than an "act,"'6 which
is consistent with the code system of subdivision. The numbering
is different within sections, and the word "county" has been used
instead of "filing district."' 7
Obviously, these do not change the meaning of the act from
the meaning intended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
However, there are a few sections which do change the meaning of
the promulgated act, some materially. These will be considered in
order. Section 5,18 which specifies those creditors and purchasers
protected by a failure to record as required by the act, has been
amended to extend its coverage to liens not acquired by attach-
ment or levy, otherwise a landlord's lien is not protected ".... and
it is doubtful whether other liens 'acquired by operation of law or
judicial process' are protected."19 It is so extended by the addition
of the words "or otherwise" after "acquires [a lien] by attachment
or levy." Section 6 provides, inter alia, for filing in the office "of the
clerk of the county court in the county" in which the goods are to
be first taken.20 However, this is in no way a change of the original
draft, since it was intended that the individual states were to supply
the place of filing.21 Section 8 has a similar "filling in" for the filing
of conditional sales contracts, or copies thereof, of railroad equip-
ment, rolling stock, watercraft and barges, in the office of the
"secretary of state."22 However, that same section has been ex-
tended to include commercial watercraft and barges or any equip-
ment thereon, in addition to the railroad equipment and rolling
stock covered by the original draft of the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws.23 In section 10, a flat fee of seventy-five cents is
15 See W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 7 (Michie 1955), where "of the realty"
and §§ 17, 18, 19, 20 and 23 where "of this article" are added for clarifica-
tion. There are other instances in the Code of similar additions.
16W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1955).
'7 See W..VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § § 13, 14 and 19 (Michie 1955).
18W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 5 (Michie 1955).
19W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, Revisers' Note to § 5 (Michie 1955); Rapo-
port v. Rapoport Express Co., 90 N.J.Eq. 519, 107 AUt. 822 (1919); and see
Bent v. Weaver, 106 W. Va. 164, 167, 145 S.E. 594 (1928), wherein the
court cites the Rapoport case, supra, and indicates it would hold in accord
therewith if similar facts were presented,
20W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1955).
212A UNwoimi LAws ANN. § 51 (1924) (hereinafter cited as 2A U.L.A.).
22 W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 8 (Michie 1955).
32 Ibid.; cf. 2A U.L.A. § 71.
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provided for filing the conditional sale contract under either of the
filing sections, whereas the corresponding section of the draft of
the commissioners provided for a fee of ten cents for all contracts,
except those described in section 8, which provided a fee of one
dollar.24 Section 11, concerning the period of validity of conditional
sales, is virtually a copy of the draft of the commissioners, 25 except
that the period of validity is increased from three to five years, and
the period of extension beyond the initial five year period is in-
creased from one to two years.2 6 Section 12 is a copy of the draft
by the commissioners, providing for cancellation of the contract,
except that it provides for a fee of thirty-five cents to the clerk,
instead of ten cents.27 Section 15 of the draft by the commis-
sioners, 28 provides that any destruction with malice or intent to
defraud, or any removing of the property by the buyer to a filing
district where not filed, without giving the seller notice thereof, or
otherwise disposing of the property with claim of full ownership,
constitutes a crime. The West Virginia act divides the possible
circumstances into three situations: (1) where the amount due is
less than twenty dollars, it is a misdemeanor; (2) where the amount
is more than twenty dollars, it is a felony if done with malice or
with an intent to defraud; and (3) where it is more than twenty
dollars but is done without malice or an intent to defraud, it is a
misdemeanor.29 The draft of the commissioners 0 makes no provi-
sion for the case of a taking, destroying or removing without malice
or intent to defraud.31 There is no section in the draft of the com-
missioners comparable to section 30 of the West Virginia act,3 2
providing for the destriuction of the filed contract by the clerk of
the county court after the contract has ceased to be valid for five
years. The draft of the commissioners has two sections which the
242A U.L.A. § 85; however, the amounts were set in brackets, indicat-
in g no violation of uniformity was contemplated by different states having
different fees.
252A U.L.A. § 85.
26W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 11 (Michie 1955); prior to the 1933
amendment of this section it conformed to the draft of the commissioners
[see W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 11 (Michie 1932)].
27W. VA CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 12 (Michie 1955).
28 2A U.L.A. § 90.
29 W. VA CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 15 (Michie 1955). Note: this section pro-
vides that, "Any such removal without notice having been given shall be
deemed prima facie fraudulent."
30 2A U.L.A. § 90.
31 See Revisers' Note to W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 15 (Michie 1955).
32W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 30 (Michie 1955).
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West Virginia act does not contain.33 It is believed that these
changes from the draft by the commissioners are not so drastic
that the act cannot be considered to be truly a uniform act
judicial Interpretation
The act is constitutional; it does not impair the right of con-
tract,3 4 the title serves as a fair and reasonable index to the pur-
poses of the legislation, even though it is general in terms,35 it is
not subject to the objections of special or class legislation, since it
operates alike on all persons and property similarly situated,36 and
it does not violate the federal guaranty of equal protection of the
laws.3 7
Before the provisions of the act can be invoked, there must be a
valid contract of sale upon condition. Thus, in Toledo Scale Co. v.
Bailey,38 where conditional sale contracts made by an agent re-
quired the approval of the principal no requirement for recording
attaches before approval, since until that time there is no valid
conditional sale contract Property of the principal given to his
agent remains the principal's property, and no filing is necessary,
for this is not a conditional sale.39 The contract reserving title in
the vendor must be made contemporaneously with the sale or before
delivery of possession of the property to the vendee by the vendor.40
33 2A U.L.A. § 150; these are entitled: "Inconsistent Laws Repealed"
and "Time of Taking Effect." W. Va. Acts 1925, c. 64, contained the former of
these sections, but the revisers later omitted it as being unnecessary.
34 Underwood y. Raleigh Transportation, Equipment & Construction Co.,
102 W. Va. 305, 135 S.E. 4 (1926).
35 Bent v. Weaver, 108 W. Va. 299, 150 S.E. 738 (1929).
36 Bent v. Weaver, supra note 35.
37 Bent v. Weaver, supra note 35.
3878 W. Va. 797, 90 S.E. 345 (1916), decided before the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act was adopted in West Virginia.
39 Barnes Safe & Lock Co. v. Block Brothers Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va. 158,
18 S.E. 482 (1893); General Electric Co. v. Martin, 99 W. Va. 519, 130 S.E.
299 (1925), in which the court, at 523, enumerated the following considera-
tions as influencing its decision: that the wholesaler reserved the right to dis-
pose of the goods or take them back at any time, that the wholesaler controls
the retail price, that there was no duty on the retailer to pay until and unless
he sold the goods, that the retailer was to retain as profit a certain percentage
of the receipts from sale, that the retailer was required to keep account books
regarding the goods sent him by the wholesaler, and their proceeds, that both
retailer and wholesaler were to have the right to sell from the stock delivered
to the retailer, and that the contract contained no provision for the passage of
property.
40 Hyer v. Smith, 48 W. Va. 550, 37 S.E. 632 (1900).
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In a trial involving the provisions of the act, proof of a conditional
sale contract must be made.
4'
The portion of section 542 providing for filing of the conditional
sale contract within ten days after the making of the conditional
sale contemplates a ten-day period running from the time of the
delivery of the goods into the hands of the purchaser.48 The ten-
day period provided in the statute seems to be a "grace" period
during which the conditional seller is absolutely protected, provid-
ing he files at some time during that period.44 Even if the condi-
tional sale contract is filed after the ten day period, if it is filed
before the claims of any creditors attach or sale to bona fide pur-
chasers, the conditional seller is protected as to any claims arising
after the filing.45 There is an absolute necessity for compliance with
the act and failure to do so will defeat the seller's retention of title,
if there is in substance a conditional sale regardless of the name
given to the transaction by the parties. 46 Once the retention of title
has been perfected by recordation in one county, removal to another
county does not in any way affect the seller's rights. Only failure
to record in the county into which the goods are removed within
ten days after receiving notice of the removal will defeat the seller's
rights.4
7
Apparently, the seller is under no obligation to inquire as to
the location of the goods after the conditional sale contract is
41 Midland Investment Co. v. Nelson, 107 W. Va. 220, 148 S.E. 9 (1929)
(semble); the court does not indicate how much proof is suffcient, but it states
that an intination' by the defendant that he holds a conditional sale contract
is not sufficient.
42 W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 5 (Michie 1955).
43 Guthrie v. Howie, 110 W. Va. 164, 157 S.E. 168 (1931), in which the
court quotes 2A U.L.A. § 3, with approval, in arriving at this conclusion. Cf.
The Webster Co. v. Keystone Lumber & Mining Co., 51 W. Va. 545, 42 S.E.
632 (1902); Curtin v. Isaaesen, 36 W. Va. 391, 15 S.E. 171 (1892), which
hold that the vendor has a lien upon the goods for their price, unless stipulated
otherwise, so long as they remain in his possession, even though the reservation
of title is not recorded.
4 4 Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S.E. 735 (1925) (semble); see
Bent v. Weaver, 106 W. Va. 164, 169, 145 S.E. 594 (1928). For a full discus-
sion of this and related problems concerning the filing of conditional sales con-
tracts under the West Virginia act see: Abel, Conditional Sellers, Hostile
Claimants, and the Filing Period, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 73 (1941).
45Bent v. Weaver, 106 W. Va. 164, 145 S.E. 594 (1928); Abel, supra
note 44.
46 Huffard v. Akers, 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S.E. 124 (1902); D. H. Baldwin &
Co. v. Wagner, 33 W. Va. 293, 10 S.E. 716 (1889).
47 Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583, 146
S.E. 521 (1929).
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executed.48 In Brown v. Woody,49 the court says: "Actual notice
is as potent as constructive notice; and if a creditor or purchaser
with actual notice of the seller's rights seeks to take the property,
he is on no higher ground than if he had purchased, or obtained a
lien after due recordation of the conditional sale contract."50 When
there has been a valid contract with another to file the contract, or
presumably to give actual notice thereof, the seller can collect his
damages from the promisor for failure to file; however, the loss to
the seller must have resulted from the promisors breach.51
When the conditional sale contract is properly filed, the seller
holds a preference over all liens, other than the lien of a levy for
property tax, but after the seller's interest has been satisfied, other
liens attach in regular order of priority.52 However, even if not
filed, the seller's lien is entitled to preference against common
creditors, although it is void as to lien creditors. 53 In a case wherein
the ownership to the goods is in issue, the seller must not stand idly
by and allow the court to enter a decree awarding title to some
other party or the seller will be deemed to have waived his right to
assert his title.5 4 The seller does not have an interest in the property
which would entitle him to recover rent; before default, only the
buyer can rent the goods, and after default, the seller's only remedy
is to retake the goods, sell them and apply the proceeds to the pur-
chase price, but he could not allow the buyer to retain the goods
and later claim rent 55 Before default the usual rules applicable to
4 8 Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, supra note 47 (semble);
however, the case is not a square holding on the point since it partially bases
its conclusion on the fact that, in the contract, the buyer promised not to
remove the property from the county of filing.
49 98 W. Va. 512, 127 S.E. 325 (1925).
50 98 W. Va. at 515; accord, Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlin-
ton, 106 W. Va. 583, 146 S.E. 521 (1929), as to actual notice to creditor after
removal from one county to another without recordation in the county to which
removed.
51 Accord, Finance Co. of America v. Bailey, 106 W. Va. 651, 146 S.E.
723 (1929), in which no recovery was allowed where the loss to the seller
resulted from his failure to locate the goods, and not from the promisors failure
to record, but where the goods were located and could not be repossessed
because of the failure of the promisor to record, damages were recoverable. (No
recovery was allowed, however, because there was a lack of proof of the value
of the goods.)
52 Moran v. Lecony Smokeless Coal Co., 122 W. Va. 405, 10 S.E.2d 548
(1940); see Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583,
585, 146 S.E. 521 (1929).
53 See Moran v. Lecony Smokeless Coal Co., supra note 52, at 416.
54 See C. H. Sprague & Son v. Price Hill Colliery Co., 124 W. Va. 31, 35,
18 S.E.2d 799 (1942).
55 C. H. Sprague & Son v. Price Hill Colliery Co., supra note 54.
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creditors and debtors are applicable. Therefore, if the debtor-buyer
places money in the hands of the creditor-seller, the debtor-buyer
has the right to direct the payment of that money; but if no direc-
tion is made, the creditor-seller has the right to apply the money
to the debts as he sees fit"
The buyer has the beneficial or equitable right in the goods
bought under a conditional sales contract"1 In Cook v. Citizens Ins.
Co., the court said: "The quality of equitable right is not affected by
a balance due on the purchase price. Equitable title is not depend-
ent on the amount paid, but rests rather 'on beneficial ownership
and the right to the use of the income." 8 Apparently, the interest
which the buyer has is subject to a distress warrant for rent, but
the conditional seller's interest is paramount."9 When the buyer
defaults, he has no title or right to possession against the seller and
cannot recover from the seller for repossessing the goods without
legal process or by abortive process. 60
Before the seller can recover from the indorsers of the note
of the buyer, where there has been a default by the buyer with less
than fifty pet cent to be paid on the purchase price, the item must
have been sold pursuant to the act before the instituting of the
action or the buyer and, a fortiori, the indorsers are relieved from
liability.6' However, where the seller assigns the notes and guar-
antees them, the assignee does not accept the responsibility of re-
possessing and reselling the goods; this duty remains with the
56 Tildesley Coal Co. v. American Fuel Corp., 130 W. Va. 720, 45 S.E.
2d 750 (1947).
57 Cook v. Citizens Ins. Co., 105 W. Va. 375, 143 S.9. 113 (1928); see
Houseman v. Home'Ins. Co., .78 W. Va. 203, 212, 88 S.E. 1048 (1916),
wherein the buyer's interest was sufficient to comply with a sole and condi-
tional ownership clause of an insurance policy. But of. Moran v. Lecony
Smokeless Coal Co., 122 W. Va. 405, 10 S.E.2d 548 (1940), wherd the
court said there was a conflict of authority as to the buyer's interest, recognized
that the buyer has some character of ownership, but said the buyer does not
have legal or equitable title for tax purposes.
58 105 W. Va. 375, 377, 143 S.E. 113 (1928), But. of. Tildesley Coal Co.
v. American Fuel Corp., 130 W. Va. 720, 45 S.E.2d 750 (1947), where the
court emphasized the fact that the buyer had paid all but a small amount of
the purchase price in reaching a conclusion that the buyer was such a benefi-
cial owner that he could sell the item to a third person subject to the condi-
tional seller's "lien" for the balance of the purchase price.
59 Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S.E. 735 (1925) (semble). For
a discussion of the problem of creditors of the buyer reaching the buyer's in-
terest while the seller's interest is still paramount, see: Note, 42 W. VA. L.Q.
152 (1936).
60 Kisner v. Commercial Credit Co., 114 W. Va. 811, 174 S.E. 330 (1934).
61 Central Acceptance Corp. v. Frye, 103 W. Va. 689, 138 S.E. 369
(1927).
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conditional seller of the goods.62 The court has been lenient in
construing the meaning of the provision of section 1663 allowing
the seller to repossess without legal process if there will be no
breach of the peace.64 After the seller has repossessed, if more
than fifty per cent of the purchase price has been paid, there must
be a resale within thirty days; however, where less than fifty per
cent of the purchase price has been paid, if there is no demand by
the buyer, the seller can voluntarily resell as is provided in the com-
pulsory resale section. Since no time is stated for this voluntary
resale, it must be within a reasonable time, prompt action normally
being required.65 Where a compulsory resale is called for, the
seller must account to the buyer the amount received by a private
resale, and the buyer can recover his damages from a failure to
publicly sell as required, but apparently the seller has the right to
set-off debts owed him by the buyer outside the conditional sale
contract.66 Usually, when the goods are sold at a public sale, they
must be physically present at the time and place of the sale.67
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. 68 By repossessing
the property without resale, the seller relieves the buyer from all
obligation under the conditional sale contract However, where
there has been a cash down payment or a promissory note in lieu
thereof, the seller can still enforce this note even though he retains
possession of the goods, for, unless it so specifies, such a note is
62 See Midland Investment Co. v. Nelson, 107 W. Va. 220, 224, 148
S.E. 9 (1929).
63 W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 16 (Michie 1955).
64 See Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 122 W. Va. 82, 86, 7 S.E.
2d 436 (1940), in which the prying open of a locked automobile door was said
not to be a breach of the peace, although reprehensible; however, the court,
at 85, said: "We wish to emphasize the fact that the question of whether the
method that was used to repossess the car was justified or is to be approved
is not here involved. If it were we should emphatically disapprove that
method."
65 Central Acceptance Corp. v. Massey, 107 W. Va. 503, 148 S.E. 864'
(1929).
6 6 Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation, Equipment & Construction Co.,
102 W. Va. 305, 135 S.E. 4 (1926) (semble).
67 Commercial Investment Trust v. Browning, 108 W. Va. 585, 52 S.E. 10
(1950).
68 Emery's Motor Coach Lines v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 136
W. Va. 735, 68 S.E.2d 370 (1951), involved a deed of trust of busses used
in public transportation, the court saying public service, which the company
was obligated to furnish, would be disrupted by requiring the busses to be
physically present at the public sale; however, the effectiveness of this decision
is weakened by the courts alternate reliance on a provision in the deed of
trust for a private sale.
"287
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not a part of the conditional sales agreement.69 Even though there
can be no waiver of the provisions of the act before or at the time
of making the contract,70 by express language, the parties can sub-
stitute a new contract for the old contract, after the old one has
been entered into.7
1
The Uniform Sales Act, by requiring recordation of the con-
tract, is intended to protect creditors and purchasers who do not
have notice of the reservation of title in the vendor, but the state
is neither a creditor nor a purchaser when it condemns conditionally
sold property for illegal use thereof by the buyer; therefore, the
state cannot invoke the act to defeat the seller's interest.72 When
goods sold under a conditional sale contract are taken upon the
premises of the buyer, they are liable for the buyer's rent unless
the landlord is given actual or constructive notice of the seller's
interest 73 Unless the seller, by terms of the contract or by his sub-
sequent conduct, has given express authority to the vendee to keep
the property in repair, the interest of a conditional seller has priority
to that of the lien of a mechanic for repairs. 74 Where the condi-
tional seller sells to special receivers appointed by the court, the
goods to become a part of a plant, the prior lienors' rights are
superior to those of the conditional seller after the goods are af-
fixed to the plant.75 Goods sold under a conditional sale contract
which is not recorded and no notice of which is given to creditors
are subject to a deed of trust on all goods to be acquired in the
future by the buyer in priority to the claim of the conditional
seller.71 Certain rules established by comity, such as the rules gov-
erning recordation of certain instruments,77 are subject to change
69 West Virginia Mack Sales Co. v. Brown, 81 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1954);
two judges dissented; the majority opinion indicates that a reference in the
note to the conditional sale contract or vice versa might cause a contrary result,
showing the necessity for careful drafting of the instrument.
70 W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 26 (Michie 1955).
71 Davis v. International Harvester Co. of America, 110 W. Va. 121, 157
S.E. 584 (1931) (rehearing denied April 3, 1931); one judge dissenting.7 2 See State v. Hall, 91 W. Va. 648, 658, 114 S.E. 250 (1922).
7 3 Hufford v. Akers, 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S.E. 124 (1902).
74Commercial Credit v. Oakley, 103 W. Va. 270, 137 S.E. 13 (1927),
citing, at 271, 2A U.L.A. 84; Scott v. Mercer Garage Co., 88 W. Va. 92,
106 S.E. 425 (1921).
75 Lazear v. Ohio Valley Steel Foundry Co., 65 W. Va. 105, 63 S.E. 772
(1909).
76 Triumph Electric Co. v. Empire Furniture Co., 70 W. Va. 164, 73 S.E.
325 (1911).
77 Southern Finance Co. v. Zegar, 120 W. Va. 420, 198 S.E. 875 (1938);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Trussler, 122 W. Va. 300, 9 S.E.2d 145
(1940).
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by the legislature; however, the exercise of this right by the legisla-
ture in one field, as in the field of conditional sales contracts, does
not in any way affect or limit the recordation requirements of other
security arrangements, not expressly included.
78
The act makes special provision for the sale of fixtures on con-
ditional sale contracts,79 which causes a preliminary question of
the meaning of the word "fixture." In Freeman v. Traux,80 the court
held that if the removal of the goods could be effected without
material injury to the building, and if there is not evidence of inten-
tion that the goods should become a permanent acquisition to the
freehold, the goods are not fixtures within the meaning of the act.
Where goods are delivered, under a recorded conditional sale
contract, to one who deals in that kind of goods, the seller is not
protected against a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary course of
the conditional buyer's business, if the seller expressly or impliedly
consents to the buyer's reselling the goods.81 Express consent is not
necessary, the statute contemplating admission of evidence as to
the acts and words of the seller which would amount to implied
consent.
82
Where a conditional sale is valid in another jurisdiction in
which it was executed without recording, it is valid in West Vir-
ginia, since section 5 does not affect a sale not taking place in this
state.83 However, section 14 does affect such a conditional sale
where the goods are brought into this state, requiring either re-
cordation or actual notice within ten days after notice of the
removal.84
Jurisdictional Comparison
In comparing the act and the decisions thereunder with the
draft of the commissioners and the comments of intention thereto,85
7 8 Southern Finance Co. v. Zegar, supra note 77; Bank of Quinwood v.
Marcum, 133 W. Va. 748, 58 S.E.2d 284 (1950).
79 W. VA. CoDE c. 40, art. 3, § 7 (Michie 1955).
80 103 W. Va. 132, 186 S.E. 697 (1927) (No. 5787).
81W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 9 (Michie 1955); Dransfield v. Boone-
Armstrong Motor Car Co., 102 W. Va. 370, 135 S.E. 286 (1926).
8 2 Dransfield v. Boone-Armstrong Motor Car Co., supra note 81.
83W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 5 (Michie 1955); Richardson v. Lumber-
men's Ins. Co., 122 W. Va. 82, 7 S.E.2d 436 (1940).
84 Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., supra note 83.
052 U.L.A. (1922); 2A U.L.A. (1924); note: 2 U.L.A. was compiled
prior to West Virginia's adopting the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
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it is gratifying to note that the West Virginia court has fulfilled the
obligation of section 3088 of the act as to uniformity of interpreta-
tion. Of course, where the wording of the West Virginia act is
different from that of the draft by the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws, a different interpretation by the court can be anticipated.
87
However, the general intention of the act to make uniform the law
of the varying states who adopt the act s" has been adhered to, with
the result that the outcome of a particular case can be more easily
predicted by attorneys attempting to advise clients, since if no
West Virginia case povers the problem at hand, the comments and
cases covering the act from other jurisdictions can be relied upon
to the extent, at least, that those jurisdictions themselves uphold
the obligation of uniformity of interpretation.
H. R. A., Jr.
86 W. VA. CoDE c. 40, art. 3, § 30 (Michie 1955).
87 The matter of difference in wording between the West Virginia and the
commissioners' drafts of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act has been pre-
viously discussed in this note.
88W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 3, § 30 (Michie 1955).
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